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THE ATTORNEY AS AN OFFICER OF
THE COURT: TIME TO TAKE THE
GOWN OFF THE BAR
ROBERT J. MARTINEAU*
I. INTRODUCTION
Today the legal profession and its members are subject to
extensive regulation by the courts. This power can be exercised
through judicial rule-making power or by decision in individual
cases. The courts dictate the moral, educational and residential
qualifications for admission to the bar, and the necessity of tak-
ing a bar examination. They have imposed requirements that at-
torneys belong to a bar organization and participate in continu-
ing legal education programs. They specify the standards for
discipline of attorneys, and the procedures and personnel
through which the standards are enforced. They have mandated
that attorneys provide services not only to the courts but to pri-
vate individuals. They have even gone so far as to require that
attorneys pay for their supervision by the courts.
Courts have stated various grounds for their authority to ex-
ercise this pervasive control. Over the past century one of the
two most common justifications in support of judicial control
has been the concept of attorneys as officers of the courts. The
title is used almost as an incantation with little or no analysis of
what the title means or why a particular result should flow from
it. In most cases, the only logic stated is that because an attor-
ney is an officer of the court, ipso facto a certain result follows.
This reasoning has the fundamental defect of substituting a la-
bel for an analysis. Courts should analyze the role of the attor-
ney in terms of the function of the attorney in the legal system,
and determine whether the result purportedly dictated by the
label is necessary or appropriate for the proper functioning of
*Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law. J.D., University of Chicago. The
author wishes to express his appreciation to Catherine Fuller and Patricia Davidson for
their assistance in the preparation of this Article and to Barbara Glesner for her editorial
suggestions.
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the legal system. When courts have analyzed the issue, however,
the analysis has been limited to an historical examination of the
status of English attorneys. Because attorneys in England were
considered officers of the court and were subject to regulation by
the courts, this type of analysis concludes that attorneys in the
United States are also officers of the court and thus are subject
to judicial regulation.
Although the title "officer of the court" appears routinely in
cases and in court rules concerning the legal profession, there
has never been a systematic analysis of the origin and develop-
ment of the title or of the extent to which that phrase has been
used to justify control of the legal profession, to impose duties
on attorneys, or to resolve other questions relating to the legal
profession.1 Similarly, there has never been an analysis of
whether the concept of "officer of the court" is an appropriate
basis for deciding any or all of these questions. These analyses
are necessary, however, in view of the pervasiveness of judicial
regulation of the legal profession and the frequency with which
courts determine the duties of attorneys. If courts are to have
the power to regulate the legal profession and determine the du-
ties of attorneys, their decisions should be based on something
more substantial than a title with medieval English origins.
When these decisions rest only on the historical basis, at best
the validity of the result is suspect; at worst, the courts may be
using faulty analysis to reach an incorrect result.
This Article has three principal purposes. First, the Article
explains how the "officer of the court" title developed in Eng-
land and how it was used in this country prior to 1870. Second,
it demonstrates how the title has been used by American courts
during the past century to support judicial control of the legal
profession and to impose specific duties upon attorneys. Third,
to determine whether there exist more substantial bases for judi-
cial control, this Article examines specific duties imposed by
courts employing the "officer of the court" analysis.
1. The only authority which has questioned reliance on the title for these purposes
is L. PATTERSON & E. CHEATHAM, THE PROFESSION OP LAw 36-37 (1971). The authors
maintain, without citing any authority, that the contention that an attorney is an officer
of the court is denied as often as it is made and question its use as a basis for determin-
ing the duties or privileges of an attorney in any particular case.
[Vol. 35
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I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. England
The significance of the historical development of the "officer
of the court" title of attorneys in England cannot be overempha-
sized. As a result of the reliance placed on the English tradition
by American courts, it is reasonable to assume that had the title
not developed in England, it never would have developed in the
United States.
The division of the English legal profession into two sepa-
rate professions or two branches of the same profession2 barris-
ters and solicitors-is more than an historical oddity. The differ-
ence between solicitors, and their attorney predecessors, and
barristers goes back to the very beginning of the English legal
system.3 For purposes of this study, the most significant differ-
2. M. BIRKS, GENTLEMEN OF THE LAW 3 (1960)(two professions). Contra 2 W. HOLDS-
WORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 311-12 (3d ed. 1923)(two branches of the same profes-
sion). For a comprehensive discussion, see also 6 id. at 432-48 (3d ed. 1927) and 8 id. at
222 (3d ed. 1926).
3. The initial distinction was between one who spoke in court on behalf of another
and one who, for the purpose of litigation, represented or stood in the place of another.
The former was at various times known as pleader, narrator, counteur, serjeant-counteur,
serjeant, apprentice, utter barrister and, ultimately, as barrister. The latter was known as
responsalis, attorney eo namine, solicitor, attorney and, finally, as solicitor. In the earli-
est times both the courtroom advocate and the litigation representative were selected
from among friends, relatives, or subordinates. A major difference between the two was
that while his advocate argued for him the litigant was in court and was free to disavow
whatever the advocate said; the advocate's only role was persuasion and he was selected
solely on the basis of his skill in oral advocacy. He was not the agent of the litigant. The
representative, on the other hand, stood in the place of the litigant and was able to bind
the litigant for better or for worse. Early English law required no special permission to
use a courtroom advocate, but a representative for litigation could be appointed only
with permission of the King. Appearance in person was the rule and appearance by a
representative was allowed only in unusual circumstances.
As the amount and complexity of litigation expanded, some persons demonstrating
skills as courtroom advocates or litigation representatives began providing these services
on a professional basis for a fee. Because the skills were essentially different-the court-
room advocate had to know the substance of the law and had to be an effective per-
suader while the litigation representative had to know the details of procedure and the
mysteries of the writs-some persons performed one type of service and different per-
sons the other. Over the centuries the distinction between the two types of professional
persons continued and eventually developed into the two legal professions or two
branches of the same profession today-barristers and solicitors. See 2 W. HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 2, at 311-16; 6 Id. at 432-48; 8 Id. at 222; R. PouND, THE LAwYER FROM
ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 78-79, 84-85, 98-107 (1953); F. PoLLocK & F. MAITLAND,
3
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ence between barristers and solicitors is that barristers and their
predecessors have never been considered officers of the court,
while solicitors and their attorney predecessors have been so
considered for many centuries.4 This difference cannot be attrib-
uted to any disparity in the relative importance of the two pro-
fessions because both are essential to the proper functioning of a
court. It has been suggested that the difference arises from the
fact that barristers and their predecessors were subject to regu-
lation by the Inns of Court and regulation by the courts was
therefore unnecessary. In contrast, the solicitor or attorney was
not subject to regulation by any similar institution; consequently
the courts assumed that task.5
Two explanations of the English attorney's special title were
commonly accepted. One explanation was that an attorney was
subject to court regulation because he was an officer of the court.
The other was that an attorney was an officer of the court be-
cause he was subject to its regulation. Whatever version was
given, no effort was ever made to go behind the statements. The
title's accuracy was an accepted truism. The treatment given to
the "officer of the court" title by Professor Holdsworth in his
monumental treatise on English law is illustrative of the tradi-
tional approach.6 Other authorities make even less effort than
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 213 (1968); T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW 216-17 (1956).
4. See 3 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND §§ 1113, 1132 (4th ed. 1973); 6 IV. HOLDS-
WORTH, supra note 2, at 434.
5. 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 2, at 434-35.
6. In his discussion of the history of the legal profession, Professor Holdsworth re-
fers on several occasions to the evolution of the title of attorneys as officers of the court.
The first reference is to the ordinance of Edward I issued in 1292, which directed that
the judges of the common law courts provide a certain number of "attorneys and appren-
tices" from every county to which the courts travelled, and that those chosen "and no
others" should follow the court and take part in its business. Holdsworth comments that
the ordinance may have resulted in those appointed attorneys' having a practical monop-
oly in representing litigants in the common law courts. He then goes on to say. "We can
see the beginning of the process which will make the attorney for legal business an 'of-
ficer of the court' which has appointed him, and separate definitely his sphere of action
from that of the pleader." 2 Id. at 317-18.
Later, in reciting the history of barristers and the Inns of Court in the fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries, Holdsworth describes the classes of members of the Inns. After
describing the three main classes-the Benchers and Readers, the Utter-Barristers, and
the Inner-Barristers--he comments that some professional attorneys were also members
of the Inns of Court.
It is clear that at this period attorneys were rapidly becoming a distinct profes-
544 [Vol. 35
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Holdsworth to explain the "officer of the court" title.7
sional class. . . . The increase in the number of professional attorneys made
the need for regulating them pressing. It is not therefore surprising to find that
attorneys for the purposes of legal business were becoming officers of the court
and as such subject to the control of the judges.
Id. at 504-05 (footnote omitted).
At another point in his work, Holdsworth again distinguished between the attorney
for litigation and the pleader and traces the long-term effect of the distinction on the
English legal profession. Referring to the fourteenth century, he notes the greater free-
dom with which litigants were permitted to appoint attorneys. He then states: "At the
same time legislation was separating the attorney for purposes of litigation from other
attorneys. The former was becoming subject to the control of the courts, and was begin-
ning to be regarded as an officer of the courts." 6 Id. at 432-33 (footnote omitted).
Holdsworth notes that the difference between the two branches of the legal profes-
sion deepened during this period, but for reasons different from those that gave rise to
the original distinction. "The new reasons turned upon differences in the mode of ap-
pointment, the discipline, the personnel, the education, and the work of the two classes
of legal practitioners." 6 Id. at 433. As to appointment, the judges delegated the power to
admit barristers to the Inns of Court, while attorneys were admitted directly by the
judges of the court. Medieval statutes gave judges control over attorneys and this control
was exercised directly by orders of the court, although statutes continued to be passed
by Parliament on related subjects. Holdsworth concludes:
The attorney was never allowed to forget that he was an officer of the court
and subject to its discipline. The barrister, on the other hand, was in no sense
an officer of the court, and was much less directly under its control.
The attorneys, being officers of the court, were closely connected by their
method of appointment, by their privileges, and by their business, with the
other members of clerical staff of the courts. . . . No doubt the same persons
often acted as attorneys both in the Common Pleas and in the King's
Bench. . . . But it is obvious that the necessity for separate admission in each
court emphasized the fact that the attorneys were the officers of that court;
and the same fact was still further emphasized by orders for their constant
attendance in their respective courts, and by their possession of the same privi-
leges of exemption from public service, and immunity from suit, except in their
own court, as the other officials of the various courts enjoyed.
6 Id. at 434-36 (footnotes omitted).
Holdsworth does point out substantial differences between the development of at-
torneys in the common law courts and of solicitors in the Court of Chancery, Court of
Requests, and Star Chamber. For present purposes, the principal difference is that in the
common law courts the litigants could employ any person admitted to practice by the
court to act as attorney for litigation in that court, whereas in the other courts only
persons on the clerical staffs of the courts could act as attorneys. Because of this limita-
tion, another profession-that of the solicitor-developed to aid litigants in those courts.
Eventually solicitors supplanted the court staff in rendering services performed by attor-
neys in the common law courts. Holdsworth denies, however, that the "officer of the
court" status of modern solicitors is attributable to the requirement in the Court of
Chancery and other noncommon law courts that litigants employ only members of the
clerical staffs of those courts as attorneys. 2 Id. at 314-18, 504-05; 6 Id. at 432-36, 454-56.
7. Blackstone, in his Commentaries, after referring to the change in English proce-
dure by which litigants were freely permitted to be represented by attorneys, states:
5
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The only author who has attempted to explore in depth the
"officer of the court" designation of English attorneys and solici-
tors is Michael Birks in Gentlemen of the Law, published in
1960.8 Birks' explanation of how attorneys acquired the title of
These attorneys are now more formed into a regular corps; they are admitted
to the execution of their office by the superior courts of Westminster-Hall; and
are in all points officers of the respective courts in which they are admitted:
and, as they have many privileges on account of their attendance there, so they
are peculiarly subject to the censure and animadversion of the judges.
3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 26. With the one major exception noted infra note 8,
the other English authorities on the development of the English legal profession either
make no mention of the "officer of the court" status or they use the phrase only in a
descriptive manner with no attempt to explain its historical development or legal
significance.
8. M. BiEKs, supra note 2. This work represents the only effort to explain the devel-
opment of the professional attorney in practical terms from the standpoint of the litigant
and the conditions existing in the courts in medieval England. The book is significant in
showing how and why the attorney and the solicitor acquired the status of officer of the
court, and it thereby provides a basis for analysis of the effect of that status upon the
legal profession in this country.
Birks begins his analysis by depicting the problems faced by the ordinary person
who sought a writ to initiate a lawsuit or who had been served with a writ and who had
to defend the action. The officials the ordinary litigant was most likely to know were the
under-sheriffs, who served the writs as well as collected the taxes, and the clerks who
worked in the courts. Either of these types of officials was likely to be knowledgeable
about proceedings in the court and was available for a fee to perform services for liti-
gants. Birks notes that under feudalism, public office was granted in exchange for ser-
vices. The office was for life, provided the services were performed. Public office was a
form of property which the owner could use as he saw fit. Birks comments:
For a long time attorneyship was little more than a service which the court
clerks and those connected with the sheriff's office were, by reason of their
experience, well qualified to perform. In the course of time the demand for
such services reached a point where a few men found it worth while to devote
themselves entirely to this task.
Id. at 32. Birks proceeds to describe the situation in the early fourteenth century, at the
end of the reign of Edward I:
By the same period attorneyship was becoming a recognized way of earning
money if not yet a source of livelihood on its own. It was thus a natural transi-
tion for the sheriff's office, who was prepared to act as attorney, to become the
attorney who was willing to perform the duties of under-sheriff.
Id. at 35. Birks notes that beginning with the late fourteenth century and continuing to
the present time, under-sheriffs have been selected from the ranks of attorneys and
solicitors.
Court clerks were an even more abundant source of supply for attorneys. Birks
states that in the fifteenth century filacers and protonotaries and the clerks of the latter
were the officials usually found to be acting as attorneys.
By the seventeenth century, attorneys were associated exclusively with the
protonotaries offices and every attorney was attached to the office of one par-
ticular protonotary into whose office the attorney had to bring all his business.
Even as late as the eighteenth century the attorneys of the Court of Common
6
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officer of the court is quite different from the traditional one
given by Holdsworth 9 and by the courts in this country.10 He
explains that attorneys were treated as officers of the court be-
cause most of them initially had some independent official sta-
tus, such as that of a clerk of the court or an under-sheriff. That
status not only made them subject to regulation by the court but
also gave them certain privileges: freedom from other public ser-
vice and being subject to suit only in their own courts, both very
important privileges in medieval England, not to mention the
privilege of wearing court gowns. It was a natural development
that when persons who did not have one of these official court
positions began to function as professional attorneys, they
sought to obtain the same title and attendant privileges of the
attorneys who were court officers." It soon became common-
place to refer to all professional attorneys as officers of the court
whether or not they held any other official court position. The
fact that in the Court of Chancery and several other noncommon
law courts only clerks of the court could appear as attorneys'
2
Pleas were sometimes referred to as entering clerks.
Id. at 37.
Birks describes several paintings of the royal courts in about 1450, which include
depictions of the gowns of the judges, the serjeants, the protonotaries, the clerks, and the
attorneys. The attorney's gown was similar to those of the clerks. Birks notes that gowns
were strictly regulated by the sumptuary laws, and that wearing a court gown was a right
accorded to attorneys as officers of the courts. Id. at 37. (Hence the title of this Article.)
9. See supra note 6.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 16-44.
11. M. BmKs, supra note 2, at 37-38. The heart of Birks' explanation of the develop-
ment is set forth in the following terms:
The present-day status of the solicitor as an officer of the court undoubtedly
originated in the early association of attorneyship with the court clerks. An
ordinance of Edward I and a statute of 1402 ... are usually put forward as the
first steps in this direction. The basis for this proposition seems to be that in
making attorneys officers of the court the judges were able to exercise control
over them. But the attorney standing in the shoes of his client was as much a
party to the proceedings as the client, and no one has ever suggested that the
courts had no control over the behaviour of litigants; indeed, such control is
essential to the administration of justice. The more likely explanation is that
the professional attorneys who were not royal clerks (and for the greater part
of the thirteenth century they were in the minority) wished to be treated on
the same footing as the attorneys who were clerks. There were various privi-
leges which clerks in the service of the Crown enjoyed, the most important
being exemption from military and civil duties and the right to be sued only in
their own court.
Id.
12. 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 2, at 369-70. Holdsworth also suggests that only
7
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supports Birks' thesis. His theory also provides an explanation
for the fact that barristers and their predecessors were never
considered officers of the court even though their principal activ-
ity consisted of representing litigants before the court. The usual
explanation given for the difference in status-that the barris-
ters were subject to regulation by the Inns of Court and attor-
neys were not13 - ignores the fact that attorneys were, until the
sixteenth century, permitted to be members of the Inns of
Court 4 and that for a time the Inns of Chancery were to attor-
neys what the Inns of Court were to barristers.15
B. United States
The history of the legal profession in America prior to the
Revolution does not reflect any awareness of or reliance on the
"officer of the court" title of attorneys.1 ' Powers of admission to
practice in the colonies were exercised by governors, legislative
bodies, or courts prior to the Revolution.1 7 No published reports
exist of disputes between these governmental authorities over
who had the power to admit attorneys and regulate the legal
court officials could serve as attorneys in the three common law courts. 2 Id. at 317. If
that were true, it would provide additional support for tracing the "officer of the court"
title of solicitors to the official position held by those who served as attorneys.
13. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
14. 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 2, at 441.
15. M. BinKs, supra note 2, at 111. It is particularly ironic that during the late nine-
teenth century and early twentieth century, when the courts in this country were relying
on the historical title of attorneys and solicitors as officers of the courts to justify regula-
tion of the legal profession by the courts, control over solicitors in England was being
transferred by legislation from the courts to the Law Society, the solicitors present coun-
terpart to the Inns of Court. In 1888 the Law Society was given authority to investigate
complaints against solicitors and in 1919 it was given authority to discipline its members.
B. ABEL-SMITH & R. STEvENs, LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK 188-190 (1965). The Law Soci-
ety has similarly been given authority to set the educational requirements for solicitors'
admission to practice, again by legislation. 15 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 2, at 231-32,
239-40; Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, LAwYERs AND THEIR WORK 470 (1967). Thus, al-
though solicitors today have the formal status of officers of the court, regulation over
them is little different from that over barristers who have never been considered officers
of the court: both barristers and solicitors are regulated by self-governing organizations
of their peers. In England today, consequently, the status of solicitors as officers of the
court is an historical oddity and is no longer the basis for judicial control over those
practicing as solicitors.
16. See generally R. POUND, supra note 3; C. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
BAR (1911).
17. R. POUND, supra note 3, at 144-56.
[Vol. 35
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profession. In some colonies legislative bodies expressly granted
this power to the courts."" After the Revolution, the situation
did not change substantially, except that the New York Consti-
tution of 1777 expressly granted the courts power to admit per-
sons to the practice of law, a power previously exercised by the
governor.19 It is also significant that in most colonies and states
no division between barristers and attorneys or solicitors
developed.20
Leigh's Case, decided by the Supreme Court of Virginia in
1810, appears to be the first case in this country in which the
"officer of the court" title of an attorney was discussed.2 1, In de-
ciding that an attorney was not a civil or military officer, Judge
Roane commented that an attorney's position is similar to that
of a juror, who also has responsibilities and duties to execute
faithfully. The "office" held meant nothing more than the duties
owed by the person to the court arising out of the person's rela-
tionship to it. 22 He explained that it was not necessary to con-
sider whether and to what degree attorneys in this country were
considered officers of their respective courts as they were in
England. He recognized that, unlike their American counter-
parts, English attorneys had many privileges which could ac-
count for their special status.23 Thus in 1810 Judge Roane took
the same view that Birks would take 150 years later: that the
evidence of privileges, and not the fact of court regulation or the
duties of attorneys, was the basis of the title and status of officer
of the court.
In another early case, Byrne v. Stewart,4 decided in 1812,
18. For example, in 1712 South Carolina adopted the English Statute of Henry IV,
thus giving the South Carolina Supreme Court authority to examine, swear-in, and enroll
attorneys. Id. at 153.
19. Id. at 151; 2 A. CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 36
(1965).
20. M. BiRKS, supra note 2, at 257; 2 A. CHROUST, supra note 19, at 227-28; Q. JOHN-
STONE & D. HopsoN, supra note 15, at 357-58. However, in several colonies and states,
including New Jersey and Massachusetts, distinctions were made for some time. Id. In
New Jersey, the distinction lasted until 1958. Consalus, New Jersey's Bifurcated Bar, 12
SEroN HALL L. Rnv. 242, 250 (1982).
21. 15 Va. (I Munf.) 468 (1810). The case involved the question of whether an attor-
ney had to take an oath regarding dueling which was required of every civil or military
officer of the commonwealth.
22. Id. at 481-82.
23. Id. at 482.
24. 3 S.C. Eq. (3 Des.) 466 (1812).
1984]
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Chancellor Waite of South Carolina held that the office of solici-
tor "is no more a public one than would be any other profession
or trade which the legislature might choose to subject to similar
regulations .. ,"21 A third early case, decided in 1835 by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, held that an attorney as an officer
of the court possessed an office that could not be summarily re-
voked by a court. In support of its conclusion the court cithd the
oath taken by the attorney and a constitutional provision that
referred to an attorney as holding an office.2 6
Beginning in the mid 1800's, references to attorneys as of-
ficers of the court began to appear more often in judicial opin-
ions. The oldest case commonly cited is Ex parte Secombe,27 de-
cided in 1856 by the United States Supreme Court. The Court
relied on the "officer of the court" title to conclude that the dis-
barment of an attorney was a matter of discretion and could not
be reviewed by mandamus. There was, unfortunately, no citation
of authority nor any discussion of the origin or significance of
the "officer of the court" title.
The next widely cited opinion which refers to attorneys as
officers of the court is In re Cooper,28 an 1860 decision of the
25. Id. at 477.
26. Austin's Case, 5 Rawle 191, 203 (Pa. 1835). The significance of the oath taken by
an attorney is stressed in J. BENTON, THE LAWYER'S OFFICIAL OATH AND OFFICE 3-4
(1909). The significance of the oath has been rejected by other courts. Leigh's Case, 15
Va. (1 Munf.) 468, 481-83 (1810)(attorneys are engaged in a profession, not a public of-
fice; lawyers are not appointed or elected; while attorneys may be in "some sense and in
some degree, officers of their several Courts. .. [,] they are not officers under the govern-
ment of the Commonwealth"); Sowers v. Wells, 150 Kan. 630, 635, 95 P.2d 281, 284
(1939)("[a]n attorney is an officer of the court, but he is not an officer of the state, and
the admission of a person to practice as an attorney is not an appointment to public
office"); Ex parte Galusha, 184 Cal. 697, 698, 195 P. 406, 406 (1921)("[w]hile attorneys
are, in one sense, officers of the court, they are in no sense officers of the state nor do
they hold a 'public' trust").
27. 60 U.S. 9 (1856). In an opinion by Chief Justice Taney, the Court held that it
could not review by mandamus a disbarment of an attorney by the Supreme Court of the
Territory of Minnesota, the act being judicial, and within the discretion of the court. The
opinion, in referring to an unreported case decided earlier the same year involving a
disbarment by a district court of the United States, stated that the relationship between
a court and those who practice before it and their rights and duties are regulated by
common law. "And it has been well settled, by the rules and practice of common law
courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become
one of its officers, as an attorney and counsellor, and for what cause he ought to be
removed." Id. at 13.
28. 22 N.Y. 67 (1860). In that case, the court upheld a statute providing that gradu-
ates of the Columbia College Law School were qualified to be admitted to the bar. The
10
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New York Court of Appeals. In an opinion which has been re-
jected by most states, 9 the court held that the power to admit
attorneys to the practice of law was not inherently judicial. In
deciding that the act of admission was, nonetheless, a judicial
act, the court stated that an attorney was an officer of the
court.8 0 During the same period the United States Supreme
Courts and several state courts 32 held that attorneys were not
court rejected an argument that the legislature had unconstitutionally usurped the power
of the courts over admission to the bar.
29. Degnon, Admission to the Bar and the Separation of Powers, 7 UTAH L. REv.
82, 87 (1960); Green, The Court's Power Over Admission and Disbarment, 4 Tax. L.
Rav. 1, 10 n.24 (1925).
30. The opinion referred to an earlier case holding that, when a statute authorized a
court to appoint commissioners to open streets, the power of appointment was consid-
ered to be a judicial act because the commissioners became officers of the court and thus
proceedings involving the commissioners were judicial proceedings. 22 N.Y. at 83. The
Cooper court then went on to say:
This is an argument which applies with far greater force to the present case.
Attorneys and counsellors are not only officers of the court, but officers whose
duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature. And hence
their appointment may with propriety be entrusted to the courts, and the lat-
ter in performing this duty may very justly be considered as engaged in the
exercise of their appropriate judicial functions.
Id. at 84.
The court, in rejecting English practice as precedent for arguing that the power to
admit persons to practice law was part of the inherent power of the court, pointed out
that barristers in England were not admitted by the courts. It then noted that "[t]he
power of the court to appoint attorneys as a class of public officers was conferred origi-
nally, and has been from time to time regulated and controlled in England, by statute."
Id. at 90 (emphasis added).
In further support of its position the court quoted a provision in the 1846 New York
Constitution that directed that judges "shall not exercise any power of appointment to
public office." Id. at 92. The court stated: "The object of this provision is plain. Attor-
neys, solicitors, &c., were public officers; the power of appointing them had previously
rested with the judges, and this was the principal appointing power which they pos-
sessed." Id. Although the correctness of the court's position that attorneys are public
officers has been rejected, see In re Hathaway, 71 N.Y. 238, 242 (1877) (constitutional bar
applies only to public officers, not to officers of the court), its view of the attorney as an
officer of the court has been followed in almost every subsequent case in which the issue
of legislative control over admission has arisen.
31. The United States Supreme Court again referred to the nature of the office held
by attorneys in Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866). This case involved the constitu-
tionality of an act of Congress which required a test oath as a qualification for admission
to practice in the United States courts. The Court, in holding that the oath violated the
constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws, discussed whether an attorney as an of-
ficer of the court was also an officer of the United States. The Court noted the difference
between officers of the United States and officers of the court- the former are elected or
appointed under an act of Congress, while the latter are admitted by the Court upon
evidence of their qualifications. After reviewing the method of acquiring the evidence,
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public officers or court officers and thus were not required to
take oaths required of public or court officers; neither were they
subject to statutes that barred women from holding public office.
III. JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
When the issue before the courts changed from whether at-
torneys were public officers to whether the courts or the legisla-
ture had the power to control the legal profession and particu-
larly admission to the bar, the significance of the title of
attorneys as officers of the court increased dramatically. The
first case to cite the "officer of the court" title in the context of
bar admission was In re Mosness,3s decided in 1876 by the Wis-
consin Supreme Court. The court struck down a statute requir2
the Court remarked that the order of admission is "the judgment of the court that the
parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counsellors, and are entitled
to appear as such and conduct causes therein." Id. at 378. The language used by the
Court, id. at 378-79, has been quoted in almost every subsequent case dealing with the
officer of the court issue. The Court concluded that the order confers a right on the
attorney that cannot be revoked except for moral or professional delinquincy.
32. The Tennessee Supreme Court, construing an 1868 statute requiring courts to
have their officers take an oath every two years concerning Ku Klux Klan activities, held
that the act did not apply to attorneys.
Although, in one sense, an attorney is an officer of the court, yet, that he does
not belong to the class of officers referred to in this section, is too clear to
admit of discussion .... The language of the Act plainly indicates that it was
intended . . to apply only to those persons who held offices, and who were
subject to the orders of the Court, but not to attorneys, who hold no office, and
who are not subject to the order of the Court, except in well defined instances.
Ingersoll v. Howard, 48 Tenn. (1 Heisk) 247, 254-55 (1870).
The Colorado Supreme Court, in holding that women were not prohibited from be-
ing admitted to practice law, was even more blunt in finding no special significance in
the officer of the court label. The court noted that although the term is accurate in that
the attorney holds an important office and performs a "quasi public duty," an attorney
advances private interests. In re Thomas, 16 Colo. 441, 446, 27 P. 707, 708 (1891).
The same result was reached in In re Ricker, 66 N.H. 207, 29 A. 559 (1890). In this
case, the New Hampshire Supreme Court considered a woman's petition for admission to
the bar. After a lengthy discussion of the status of English and American attorneys and
of the attributes of public office, the court held that attorneys as officers of the court
were not public officials. Thus, women were not barred from the profession by common
law rule which barred women from public office. More recently, Virgin Islands Bar Assoc.
v. Dench, 124 F. Supp. 257 (D.V.I. 1953), held that because a person could not be a
public officer of two states and the practice of law is a public office, an attorney could not
be admitted simultaneously in two states. The position that an attorney holds a public
office was rejected most recently by the United States Supreme Court in In re Griffiths,
413 U.S. 717 (1973).
33. 39 Wis. 509 (1876).
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ing the admission in Wisconsin of any person admitted to prac-
tice in Illinois. In so doing, the court relied primarily on the fact
that,
[t]he bar is no unimportant part of the court; and its members
are officers of the court ... [a]nd if officers of the court, cer-
tainly, in some sense, officers of the state for which the court
acts .... [A]ttorneys and counsellors of a court, though not
properly public officers, are quasi officers of the state whose
justice is administered by the court.3 '
The opinion noted the importance of judicial control over its of-
ficers, and found that residence in the state was essential to that
control.
In re Day,35 decided in 1899 by the Illinois Supreme Court,
also rejected legislative control over bar admission. In an oft-
cited opinion that set the pattern for later decisions, the court
held unconstitutional a statute mandating admission to the bar
of all law school graduates who had begun law school before the
effective date of a supreme court rule on admission.38 The court
first stated that the English precedent on legislative control of
the bar was not relevant because the power of Parliament was
far greater than the power of a state legislature. It went on to
say, nevertheless, that rather than supporting legislative control
over admission of attorneys, the English practice actually re-
futed it. The court reviewed English history and concluded that
power over admission of attorneys was vested in the courts by
the 1292 ordinance of Edward I, and that no later legislature
ever attempted to take away that power. The court made only
two brief references to the attorney as an officer of the court,
both to support its conclusion on court control over admission.3
34. Id. at 510 (emphasis by the court).
35. 181 IlM. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899).
36. Id.
37. After citing cases which held that a court had the inherent power to control its
own courtroom, including the janitor, the court stated, "It would be strange, indeed, if
the court can control its own court room, and even its own janitor, but that is not within
its power to inquire into the ability of the persons who assist in the administration of
justice as its officers." Id. at 95, 54 N.E. at 652. It further added that "[tihe function of
determining whether one who seeks to become an officer of the courts [is qualified] per-
tains to the courts themselves." Id. at 96, 54 N.E. at 653. Distinguishing attorneys from
other occupations regulated by statute, the court noted that the attorney is a necessary
part of the judicial system. Id. at 97, 54 N.E. at 653.
19841
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Over the next several decades supreme courts in other
states confronted legislative efforts to control admission, disbar-
ment or suspension.38 By 1925 sixteen state courts followed the
In re Day approach.3 9 The majority of these courts referred to
attorneys as officers of the courts as part of their rationale for
judicial rather than legislative control over the legal profession.40
Another major use of the "officer of the court" title of attor-
neys has been to justify the requirement imposed by courts that
attorneys belong to a state bar association. An early expression
of this rationale, followed by courts in other states, came in 1937
from the Nebraska Supreme Court.41 Concluding that it had the
power to mandate membership in the state bar, the court rea-
soned that because the duty of the courts is the efficient admin-
istration of justice and because attorneys as officers of these
courts must assist in this goal, the practice of law is so inti-
mately related to the exercise of a court's power that the courts
"naturally and logically" have the right to regulate the bar.42
The phrase "officer of the court" has also been employed to
justify investigations of improper conduct by attorneys. The
most famous of these cases is People ex rel Karlin v. Culkin,43 a
decision of the New York Court of Appeals written by Chief
Judge Cardozo. In that case, the immediate issue was whether
an attorney could be punished for refusing to testify before a
judge empowered by a state appellate court to conduct an inves-
38. Green, supra note 29, at 12-15 n.35.
39. Id. (quoting from opinions of the supreme courts of Arizona, Colorado, Connect-
icut, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, Utah, and Virginia, and listing cases from Arkansas, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin).
40. Id.
41. In re Integration of the Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 83, 275 N.W. 265
(1937).
42. Id. at 289, 275 N.W. at 268. Judge Carter explained:
The primary duty of courts is the proper and efficient administration of jus-
tice. Attorneys are officers of the court and the authorities holding them to be
such are legion. They are in effect an important part of the judicial system of
this state. It is their duty honestly and ably to aid courts in securing an effi-
cient administration of justice. The practice of law is so intimately connected
and bound up with the exercise of judicial power in the administration of jus-
tice that the right to define and regulate its practice naturally and logically
belongs to the judicial department of our state government.
Id. The courts which have taken the same position on mandatory state bar membership
have similarly used this rationale. Degnon, supra note 29, at 87.
43. 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928).
554 [Vol. 35
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tigation. The court held that courts could make a general in-
quiry into the conduct of its officers-the members of the
bar-and compel one of its officers-an attorney-to testify.
44
The court's entire analysis was based on the status of the attor-
ney as an officer of the court, relying on the English precedent
and the English courts' power to conduct similar
investigations. 5
The foregoing makes it clear that the courts of this coumtry
have relied to a substantial degree upon the "officer of the
court" title to justify their control over the legal profession, and
in so doing have placed substantial reliance upon the status of
the English attorney as an officer of the court. The logic used by
the courts has been summarized in the following terms:
Advocates of judicial supremacy rely primarily upon the argu-
ment ... that the power to set standards of admission to prac-
tice is necessary for the exercise of the judicial office. This ar-
gument points out that attorneys are officers and assistants of
the court. And, if the court is to have reliable and competent
assistants it must be able to insure a supply of trustworthy and
competent attorneys. Without such assistants the court would
be unable properly to acquit itself of the judicial task imposed
by the state constitution on it alone. Hence, while the setting
of standards of admission and exclusion is not claimed to be
judicial, abstractly considered, nevertheless it is a means so
necessary to the end of adequate control that it is considered
"inherent" or "implied" in the judicial office itself."
Further analysis, however, shows that the title "officer of
the court" is not necessary to support judicial control of the bar.
It has been stated that power to regulate the bar belongs to the
judiciary for two reasons: "(1) the power is judicial because it is
usually exercised by the courts, [and] (2) the power is judicial
because history shows that the courts need that power." 41 It is
then stated that the latter rationale is also based on the "officer
of the court" status.48 But these two arguments do not, in fact,
depend upon the use of the "officer of the court" description.
44. Id. at 470, 162 N.E. at 489.
45. Id. at 471-77, 162 N.E. at 489-93.
46. Degnon, supra note 29, at 86 (footnotes omitted).
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The first-that the power is usually exercised by the courts-is
merely an argument based on historical precedent. This argu-
ment is not totally persuasive because in both England and the
United States, until the end of the nineteenth century, legisla-
tive regulation of the bar was fairly extensive. Far more impor-
tant, however, is the second argument that judicial control of the
bar is necessary for the proper functioning of the courts. This
latter argument is the classic one of inherent or implied pow-
ers-that a branch of government has all those powers necessary
for it to perform its constitutional function. This same theory
has been used by the courts to give them control over their per-
sonnel, facilities, and funding."9 Courts have long asserted that a
bar is essential to their proper functioning. 0 It thus follows that
the courts can regulate the bar. This power to regulate depends,
consequently, on the court's perceived necessity for it, and not
on the title of the attorney as an officer of the court.
Perhaps the most rational approach to the officer of the
court status and its relationship to the power of the courts over
the legal profession was stated by the Supreme Court of Wiscon-
sin when it considered whether to require that all attorneys be-
long to the state bar association:
We must reiterate, the primary duty of the courts as the judi-
cial branch of our government is the proper and efficient ad-
ministration of justice. Members of the legal profession by
their admission to the Bar become an important part of that
process and this relationship is characterized by the statement
that members of the Bar are officers of the court. An indepen-
dent, active and intelligent Bar is necessary to the efficient ad-
ministration of justice by the courts. The labor of the courts is
lightened, the competency of their personnel and the scholar-
ship of their decisions are increased by the ability and the
learning of the Bar. The practice of law in the broad sense,
both in and out of the courts, is such a necessary part of and is
so inexorably connected with the exercise of the judicial power
that this court should continue to exercise its supervisory con-
trol of the practice of the law. 1
49. See generally Note, The Court's Inherent Power to Compel Legislative Funding
of Judicial Functions, 81 MxCH. L. REv. 1687 (1983) and authorities cited therein.
50. See Green, supra note 29; Degnon, supra note 29, and the cases cited therein.
51. In re Integration of the Bar, 5 Wis.2d 618, 622, 93 N.W.2d 601, 603. The Wis-
consin Supreme Court has recently adopted new rules governing the State Bar of Wis-
[Vol. 35
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The court here does not rely on the "officer of the court"
title as the basis for court regulation of the legal profession.
Rather, the power is based upon the dependence of the courts
upon the bar. The opinion recognizes that attorneys are an es-
sential part of the administration of justice "and this relation-
ship is characterized by the statement that members of the Bar
are officers of the court. '5 2 Thus, the court does not treat the
"officer of the court" title as a legal status from which the power
to regulate flows; rather, it employs the term as a convenient
way to describe the important role that attorneys play in the
judicial process. The significance of this difference is more than
semantic. It is the difference between relying on a label and rely-
ing on an analysis of function and necessity to justify a claim of
judicial supremacy in regulation of the bar.
The weakness of the historical basis of the "officer of the
court" title of attorneys has been demonstrated. If this title were
the only basis for judicial control over the bar, that control
would be subject to serious question. The real basis for control is
the courts' practical need for a qualified bar. That practical need
is obscured, however, when the "officer of the court" title is used
to justify judicial control of the bar. As with all other profes-
sions, the power of regulation is in the legislature as part of the
police power of the state. Judicial control of the legal profession
is an exception to the usual separation of powers between the
legislative and judicial branches of government. The best rea-
soned opinions recognize that judicial control can be justified
only because of the dependence of the courts upon a qualified
bar. Without that dependence, the basis for judicial control is
removed. The title of officer of the court is consequently irrele-
vant to the issue of whether the legislature or the courts should
regulate the bar.
IV. THE DUTIES OF ATTORNEYS AS OFFICERS OF THE COURT
The American cases decided after 1870, discussed in Section
HI, dealt primarily with the "officer of the court" title in the
consin. The basis for the court's adoption of the rules is given as "the court's inherent
authority over members of the legal profession as officers of the court." Wis. SuP. CT. R.
10.02 (1980)(emphasis added).
52. 5 Wis. 2d at 622, 93 N.W.2d at 603.
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context of judicial versus legislative power over regulation of the
bar. The focus of these opinions, consequently, has been upon
separation of powers and the institutional needs of the judicial
branch of government. The other major use of the "officer of the
court" title has been in defining the obligations of individual at-
torneys. 3 This section of the Article will classify the various du-
53. Notwithstanding the significance of the privileges accorded officers of the court
to the development of the status for English attorneys, courts in this country have not
made much use of the title in defining the privileges of attorneys. The Wisconsin Su-
preme Court has said that one of the privileges of an attorney as an officer of the court is
to invoke the jurisdiction of the court on behalf of another. State v. Cannon, 196 Wis.
534, 539, 221 N.W.2d 603, 604 (1928). Much earlier, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
said: "The powers of an attorney, as an officer of the court, are very extensive. He may
waive objections to evidence, make admissions in pleading or by parol, enter nonsuits
and defaults, and make any disposition of the suit and any admission of facts that the
party himself could make." Bryant's Case, 24 N.H. 149, 153 (1851). Essentially, the privi-
lege of the attorney as an officer of the court is to represent others in litigation, to act on
behalf of and to bind the client through his acts and his omissions. Ex rel Davis, 28 Utah
2d 423, 429-30, 503 P.2d 1206, 1207 (1972)("[a]n attorney, in his function as an officer of
the court, may stipulate for and bind the party he represents on any matter of proper
concern in the proceeding"); Sinnott v. Porter, 57 Wis. 2d 462, 466, 204 N.W.2d 449, 451
(1973)("[b]ut, as such court officer, he is not to be directed to sign a document in the
name of his client where the client does not want him to do so. . ."). The Wisconsin
Supreme Court has held that because an attorney is an officer of the court he holds a
quasi-judicial office and is, consequently, entitled to immunity from suit for the dis-
charge of his professional duties in the same manner as are judicial officers. Laagen v.
Borkowski, 188 Wis. 277, 301, 206 N.W. 181, 190 (1925).
The various privileges of an attorney attributable to his status as an officer of the
court are important ones without which it would be impossible to practice law. The ques-
tion that must be asked, however, is whether the privileges actually arise from the officer
of the court status or flow from something else.
The first and most basic privilege-that of representing others in court-clearly
arises from being admitted to practice law and not from any status that may accompany
admission. The fact that English barristers represent others in court but are not officers
of the court clearly demonstrates that the two functions are not necessarily related. The
most that can be said is that if an attorney is an officer of the court, that status itself
flows from the act of admission to the Bar. Take away that status, and the act of admis-
sion still carries with it the privilege of representing others in court.
The difference between the two functions is highlighted by the historical change in
the effect of admission by a state's highest court. In England, in most colonies at the
time of the revolution, and in most states thereafter, each individual court admitted
attorneys separately, and admission in one court did not entitle an attorney to practice
in any other court. R. POUND, supra note 3, at 145-96. The separate admission was one of
the factors that gave rise to the concept that an attorney was an officer of the court in
which he was admitted. M. BmKs, supra note 2, at 38. The procedure gradually devel-
oped in this country that admission to practice in the highest court of the state automat-
ically qualified the person to practice in any court in the state and that separate admis-
sion to each trial or appellate court in the state was not necessary. R. POUND, supra note
3, at 147-56. Applying the original theory that admission makes an attorney an officer of
18
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ties of attorneys which courts have said flow from the title "of-
ficer of the court.' ' " These duties will then be analyzed to
determine whether the "officer of the court" title is necessary or
appropriate in defining these obligations, and whether the duties
are better supported by a functional analysis of the needs of the
courts and the relationship of the attorney to those needs. A
functional analysis is necessary to ensure that any specific duty
imposed upon attorneys is in fact necessary for the proper oper-
ation of the courts and is not a result of a misapprehension of
the duties of an English attorney or simply an arbitrary imposi-
tion by the court.
A. Duty to Provide Services to the Court
Many courts have relied on the "officer of the court" title to
impose on attorneys the duty to represent indigent clients either
with or without compensation. The United States Supreme
Court stated in Powell v. Alabama that "[a]ttorneys are officers
of the court, and are bound to render service when required by
such an appointment."55 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit has noted that
[a]n applicant for admission to practice law may justly be
deemed to be aware of the traditions of the profession which
he is joining, and to know that one of these traditions is that a
lawyer is an officer of the court obligated to represent indigents
for little or no compensation upon court order.56
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has
commented that "[t]he source of this duty [to represent indi-
gents] is a lawyer's status as an officer of the court.
'57
the admitting court, the attorney would be an officer only of the state supreme court and
not of the other courts of the state in which the attorney is most likely to practice.
54. The duties of solicitors as officers of the court are set forth in 36 H.sBuRv's
LAWS OF ENGLAND 192-208 (3d ed. 1961). They include liability on undertakings, for
costs, losses from his conduct, for client's money, to turn over client's papers, and to
attachment.
55. 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932).
56. United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
978 (1966). See the appendix to the opinion for the history of the obligation. Id. at 636-
38.
57. Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1211, 1215 (8th Cir. 1982). The court held,
however, that the attorney could not be compelled to pay the expenses of defense. Not-
withstanding the attorney's obligation, as an officer of the court, to represent indigent
1984]
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As officers of the court, attorneys have been held to have a
duty to testify in an investigation of lawyer misconduct."8 It has
also been held that when present in court, the attorney has a
duty to testify as to the value of the services rendered by an-
other attorney without being entitled to an expert witness fee.59
Although the duties of representing indigents and testifying
are said to flow from the "officer of the court" title, it seems
more reasonable to identify the source of these obligations as the
monopoly to practice in the courts granted to attorneys by the
courts.60 This monopoly can be traced to the ordinance of Ed-
ward I in 1292, when the power of the courts to regulate admis-
sion to the bar was formally recognized for the first time."' In
exchange for this monopoly, the courts may reasonably require
attorneys to represent indigents who have a constitutional right
criminal defendants, the Supreme Court held recently that a court-appointed attorney is
not immune from liability in the performance of his duties as are other court officers or
other federal officials. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193 (1979). The Court stated that
"the primary office performed by appointed counsel parallels the office of privately re-
tained counsel." Id. at 204. The Court quoted with approval Justice Black's statement in
Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399 (1956) that distinguished between attorneys and
court officers:
It has been stated many times that lawyers are "officers of the court." One of
the most frequently repeated statements to this effect appears in Ex Parte
Garland, 71 U.S. (4 WalL) 333, 378 (1866). The Court pointed out there, how-
ever, that an attorney was not an "officer" within the ordinary meaning of that
term. Certainly nothing that was said in Ex parte Garland or in any other case
decided by this Court places attorneys in the same category as marshals, bai-
liffs, court clerks, or judges. Unlike these officials a lawyer is engaged in a pri-
vate profession, important though it be to our system of justice. In general he
makes his own decisions, follows his own best judgment, collects his own fees
and runs his own business. The word "officer" as it has always been applied to
lawyers conveys quite a different meaning from the word "officer" as applied to
people serving as officers within the conventional meaning of that term.
Id. at 202-03 n.19.
53. People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928). Attorneys in
disciplinary proceedings have, however, been held to be entitled to claim the privilege
against self incrimination. Spevack v. Klien, 385 U.S. 511 (1967). Spevack overruled Co-
hen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961) which had relied on Culkin.
59. Nugent v. Downs, 230 So.2d 597 (La. App. 1970) (relying on Roy 0. Martin Lum-
ber Co. v. Sinclair, 222 La. 226, 56 So.2d 240 (1951), which held that because attorneys
are officers of the court they must offer their services as witnesses on the value of ser-
vices rendered by another attorney).
60. See In re Brose, 51 U.S.L.W. 3898, 3899 (U.S. June 20, 1983)(unpub-
lished)("[a]n attorney is an officer of the court with a monopoly power to appear in the
court and as such is bound to refrain from pursuing vexatious and abusive litiga-
tion")(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
61. 2 NV. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 2, at 317.
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to the assistance of an attorney. The courts can not ask anyone
else to render the service because the courts permit only attor-
neys to practice law. Therefore, these services may be demanded
from those given the monopoly, and the courts have always done
SO.62 By the same token, if only an attorney can be an expert on
the services of another attorney by virtue of the monopoly
granted by the courts, the courts should be able to demand that
attorneys testify on the value of legal services-the one subject
on which the court has made them experts, to the exclusion of
all others. The "officer of the court" title would be relevant to
this issue only if attorneys, by virtue of that title, become public
officers who may be compelled to render services without com-
pensation.63 It is generally accepted, however, that the "officer of
the court" title of attorneys does not make them public of-
ficers." Attorneys' duty to render services to the court arises,
then, not from their title as officers of the court but from their
court-granted monopoly.
Further, the duty to testify in an investigation of lawyer
misconduct is no special obligation of an attorney. A court can
compel testimony of anyone, attorney or layperson, in aid of its
disciplinary authority over attorneys.6 5
B. Duty to Obey the Law
One of the earliest cases to find a duty to obey the law aris-
ing out of the "officer of the court" status of attorneys was Ex
parte Wall66 decided in 1883. In that case the Court upheld the
62. For a review of the tradition, dating back to the fifteenth century, of requiring
attorneys to provide representation, see the appendix to United States v. Dillon, 346
F.2d 633, 636 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966), where most of the histor-
ical references are to barristers being required to represent indigents. As indicated supra
note 4, however, barristers have never been considered officers of the court. The require-
ment that barristers represent indigents could not, consequently, have been based upon
any officer of the court status.
63. 63A Am. JuR. 2D, Public Officers and Employees § 5 (1984); 15A Am. JuR. 2D
Clerks of Court § 11 (1976).
64. See supra text accompanying notes 21-26; see also cases cited supra note 32.
65. AMERICAN BAR AsSOCATION, STANDARDS FOR LAwYER DIscrPLINARY AND DIsABmuTY
PROCEEDINGS § 8.34 (tentative draft 1978) (parties in lawyer disciplinary proceedings have
right to subpoena witnesses). An attorney is obligated to provide information to the bar
disciplinary authorities under MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmILrrY DR 1-
103(B).
66. 107 U.S. 265 (1883).
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disbarment of an attorney who had led a lynch mob in sight of
the court.67
More recently the Supreme Court of South Dakota upheld
the disbarment of an attorney for a felony conviction, comment-
ing: "As officers of this court, attorneys are charged with the
obedience of the laws of this state and the United States. The
intentional violation of those laws . . . by a lawyer tend[s] to
lessen public confidence in the legal profession." 8
Several courts have placed the obligation to abide by court
orders upon attorneys' "officer of the court" title. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit cautioned counsel
that "although each may be an adversary with regard to oppos-
ing parties, all serve as officers of the court and all are bound to
respect and follow the law as laid down by a final appellate judg-
ment in this case."6 9 A New York appellate court reprimanded
an attorney for a plaintiff in a default divorce action for refusing
to file the signed decree until he had been paid for his services. 0
The court stated that the attorney as an officer of the court had
an obligation to comply with the court's directive, and that it
was improper for him to refuse to file the decree without first
obtaining the permission of the court to withdraw as attorney.71
Courts have based the duty to obey statutes and court or-
ders upon the attorney's status as an officer of the court, without
explaining why the duty flows from the status. The duty has, in
fact, no relation to the "officer of the court" title.
One of the universally recognized requirements for admis-
sion to and continued membership in the bar is good moral
character. Courts look to convictions of crimes involving moral
turpitude as reflecting on moral character.72 The requirement
that an attorney obey the law is thus related to the requirement
of good moral character, and exists independently of the officer
67. The Court stated: "What sentiments ought such a spectacle to arouse in the
breast of any upright judge, when informed that one of the officers of his own court was
a leader in the perpetration of such an outrage?" Id. at 274.
68. Matter of Looby, 297 N.W.2d 487, 488 (S.D. 1980)(quoting Matter of Parker,
269 N.V.2d 779, 780 (S.D. 1978)).
69. Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 541-42 (8th Cir. 1975).
70. Kennedy v. Macaluso, 86 A.D.2d 775, 448 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1982).
71. Id. at 775, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 277.
72. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSiONAL RESPONSIBmrrY DR 1-102(A)(3)(1980); PATTERSON
& CHEATHAM, supra note 1, at 290-93.
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of the court status. The only two cases which assert a duty to
obey the law arising from the officer of the court status involved
conduct that was both felonious and involved moral turpitude.
Similarly, the duty to comply with court orders is an ethical ob-
ligation of the attorney. 3 In addition, a litigant is under the
same obligation to comply with court orders, and the attorney as
agent for the client is similarly bound.74 This obligation is also
imposed upon attorneys by the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility. 5 The duty to obey the law is not a special duty depen-
dent on the "officer of the court" title of the attorney; rather, it
is an obligation that flows through the client to the attorney or
is imposed by independent ethical standards.
C. Duty to Preserve Professional Integrity
One court, in holding that an attorney should be disquali-
fied for conflict of interest in consecutive representation of op-
posing parties in the same litigation, noted that "as an officer of
the court, an attorney is bound by the highest possible stan-
dards and as such carries the burden of avoiding the appearance
of evil."'76 The duty of an attorney to preserve his professional
integrity by avoiding conflicts of interest and other appearances
of evil is expressly imposed by the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility.7 7 This duty springs from the relationship between the
proper conduct of attorneys and public confidence in the legal
system. Many courts have enforced this obligation without find-
ing it necessary to rely on the "officer of the court" title of the
attorney.78 It is the necessity of maintaining public confidence in
the legal system, not the status of attorneys as officers of the
court, that has justified the courts' regulation of the conduct of
attorneys.
73. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmILrrY DR 7-106(A), EC 7-22 (1980).
74. Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 183 (1971).
75. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBmLTY DR 1-102(A)(3), EC 1-5 (1980);
PATTERSON & CHEATHAM, supra note 1, at 290-93 (1971). The Model Code of Professional
Responsibility does not state that any of the obligations it imposes are premised on the
officer of the court status. The preamble of the Code states, rather, that it is based upon
the vital role attorneys play in the legal system.
76. Northeastern Oklahoma Community Dev. Corp. v. Adams, 510 P.2d 939, 939-41
(Okla. 1973).
77. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105, DR 9-101 (1980).
78. PATTERSON & CHEATHAM, supra note 1, at 236-37.
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D. Duty to Preserve the Integrity and Dignity of the Legal
System
Courts have relied on the "officer of the court" title to im-
pose upon attorneys a duty to uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal system. In finding an attorney in contempt of court
for saying in open court, "This is a farce," a federal district
court commented: "Respondent's status as an officer of the
Court is not to be overlooked; as such he has a higher duty to
assist in maintaining the dignity of the Court than the ordinary
citizen. '7 9 A Florida appellate court chastised a defense attorney
for alleging in a petition that the witnesses for the state had
been bribed and that the appellate court had been pressured to
affirm the conviction: "[T]he attorney would have been well ad-
vised to consider his obligation, as a member of the bar and of-
ficer of the court, to protect and defend the court and its judges
against unwarranted, irresponsible, and inexact aspersions
M80
As with the duty to preserve the attorney's professional in-
tegrity, the duty to preserve the integrity and dignity of the le-
gal system is found in the Code of Professional Responsibility,"'
which in turn is based upon the necessity of preserving confi-
dence in the legal system. 2 It would exist whether or not attor-
neys were considered officers of the court.
E. Duty to Promote Fair Administration of Justice
Several courts have found that an attorney as an officer of
the court has a duty to promote the administration of justice.83
This can be a negative duty to avoid abuses of court processes
such as "harassing [persons,] . . . recklessly invoking court ac-
tion in frivolous cases," making frivolous appeals, or seeking to
79. In re Cohen, 370 F. Supp. 1166, 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
80. Cayson v. State, 139 So. 2d 719, 721 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 146
So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1962).
81. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmILry EC 9-1, EC 9-2, EC 9-6 (1980).
82. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmLrrY, Preamble (1980).
83. Gullo v. Hirst, 332 F.2d 178, 179 (4th Cir. 1964); see also WSM, Inc. v. Tennes-
see Sales Co., 709 F.2d 1084, 1088 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Rodriguez, 556 F.2d
638, 642 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978); Warren Transport v. United
States, 525 F.2d 148, 151 (8th Cir. 1975).
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deny or postpone the enjoyment of unquestioned rights.8" The
duty can also be stated positively as a duty to aid in the admin-
istration of justice by cooperating with a court in the investiga-
tion of a lawyer's misconduct85 or assuring that the party he rep-
resents receives a fair trial."' Another duty tied to the "officer of
the court" title is to avoid public debate that will work to the
detriment of the accused or that will obstruct the fair adminis-
tration of justice.
87
Attorneys as officers of the court must also cooperate with
the court "to preserve and promote the efficient operation of our
system of justice."88 In litigation the attorney's "officer of the
court" title has been used to mandate that he cooperate in dis-
covery and appear for trial at the scheduled time. 9
Specific duties, such as refraining from abuse of process or
attempting to influence the jury, apply to the litigant, the news
media, and the public in general as well as to attorneys, and
thus are not dependent upon the "officer of the court" title.
They are also found in the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity.90Avoiding public debate that will have an adverse effect
upon an accused or a litigant flows from the duty of the courts
to protect the due process rights of litigants.91 More general
statements of the duty to aid or not obstruct the administration
of justice are so broad as to state nothing more than platitudes,
and do not rise to the level of an enforceable duty.
F. Duty to be Truthful
The duty of the attorney to be truthful in dealing with the
court has been tied to the officer of the court title. The United
84. People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928).
85. United States v. Rogers, 289 F. Supp. 726 (D. Conn. 1968); Burkett v. Crulo
Trucking Co., 171 Ind. App. 166, 355 N.E.2d 253 (1976).
86. Bullock v. Branch, 130 So. 2d 74, 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
87. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 601 n.27 (1976)(Brennan, J.,
concurring).
88. Chapman v. Pacific Tel., 613 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir. 1979).
89. Canella v. Bryant, 235 So. 2d 328 (Fla. App. 1970); In re Henry, 25 Mich. App.
45, 181 N.W.2d 64 (1970); Medic Ambulance Serv. v. McAdams, 216 Tenn. 304, 392
S.W.2d 103 (1965).
90. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102, DR 7-106, DR 7-107,
DR 7-108 (1980).
91. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
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States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has said that "[a]s
an officer of the court an attorney may not knowingly make a
false statement to the court or fail to disclose what he is re-
quired by law to reveal. '9 2 In Oregon, where a statute imposed
the duty on attorneys "never to seek to mislead the court or jury
by any artifice or false statement of law or fact," the state su-
preme court attributed the duty to the attorney's title as an of-
ficer of the court, even though the statute made no mention of
it.93 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
has said that "[slince attorneys are officers of the court, their
conduct, if dishonest, would constitute fraud on the court.
'94
The existence of an obligation to be truthful independent of
the officer of the court title is demonstrated by its inclusion in
the Code of Professional Responsibility.9 5 This obligation is also
imposed on anyone dealing with the court, through perjury
statutes.
G. Duty to Know the Law
An attorney as an officer of the court has been charged with
knowledge of the law and of the effect of failure to comply with
it.96 These obligations do not, however, place the attorney in any
different position than the litigant or the average citizen. In the
two cases that have adopted this principle, the first involved an
attempt to enforce a contract found to be against public policy.
Any person, whether or not an attorney, who attempts to en-
force such a contract will be unable to do so. 7 In the second
case, an attorney was simply held to know the effect of his cli-
ent's failure to comply with discovery rules.98 In that case the
penalty would fall on the client, not on the attorney. In neither
case was the "officer of the court" title relevant to the decision.
92. United States v. Perez-Gomez, 638 F.2d 215, 217 (10th Cir. 1981).
93. In re Hubert, 265 Or. 27, 28-29, 507 P.2d 1141, 1141 (1973).
94. H.K. Porter Co. v. Goodyear, 536 F.2d 1115, 1119 (6th Cir. 1976).
95. MODEL CODE OF PRoFEssIoNAL RESPONSmmrrY DR 7-102 (1980).
96. Brown v. Gesellschaft Fur Drahtlose, 104 F.2d 227, 229 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
307 U.S. 640 (1939); Suritz v. Kelner, 155 So. 2d 831, 833 (FLa. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
97. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 178-185 (1981).
98. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b).
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H. Duty to Inform the Court of the Law and the Facts
Several courts have used the "officer of the court" title to
find an obligaton of the attorney to bring to the court's attention
relevant facts and law. Such items have included proposing jury
instructions"9 and informing the court of new developments in
relevant but not controlling case law,100 of the fact that counsel
in the pending case had in another case made an argument simi-
lar to that espoused by the opposing party,110 of confusion in the
plea made by the defendant, 0 2 and that the witness in a retrial
had recanted testimony given in the initial trial.10 3
The duty to inform the court of the law and the facts is
essentially the duty not to mislead the court and reflects the at-
torney's more general duty to be candid in dealings with the
court. These duties can be fairly ascribed to the practical neces-
sity of the court's relying on attorneys to present matters to it.'0
To the extent that the attorney is not restricted by the concomi-
tant duties to the client, the court is entitled to rely on the at-
torney in performing its functions. Because the court must rely
on the attorney, the court insists upon candor; its right to do so
is based upon its needs, however, and not upon the attorney's
classification as an officer of the court. The Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct expressly recognize an attorney's duty to be
candid before the court.10 5
L Duty to Inform the Client
In addition to finding an obligation to inform the court of
certain legal and factual matters, the courts have also held that
the attorney, as an officer of the court, has a similar obligation
toward the client. These duties include informing the client of
the dangers of mutliple-client representation by an attorney, 06
99. Rago v. Nelson, 194 Pa. Super. 317, 166 A.2d 88 (1960).
100. Miller v. AAAcon Auto Transport, 447 F. Supp. 1201, 1206 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
101. Pittway Corp. v. Lockheed Aircraft, 641 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1981).
102. Lucero v. Texas, 502 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
103. United States v. Grasso, 413 F. Supp. 166, 171 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 552 F.2d
46 (2d Cir. 1977), vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 901 (1978).
104. See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
105. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSBILrTY DR 7-102 (1980); MODEL RuLES
OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 3.3 (1983).
106. United States v. Kidding, 560 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, sub nom.,
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instructing the client to be present on the scheduled trial
date, 107 and giving the client instructions as to the terms of
bail.108 In the latter two cases, testimony of the attorney con-
cerning the advice given to the client was held not to violate the
attorney-client privilege because of the attorney's duty as an of-
ficer of the court to give the advice to the client.109
Although the duty to inform and advise a client of the legal
implications of certain matters has been attributed to the attor-
ney's "officer of the court" status, informing the client of these
matters would appear to be simply a part of the duty of the at-
torney in representing his client, and would exist independently
of the fact that he is considered an officer of the court.110
V. OTHER USES OF THE OFFICER OF THE COURT STATUS
In addition to using the officer of the court status as a basis
for various duties of attorneys, there have also been attempts to
use it for other purposes. The State of Connecticut argued in In
re Griffiths"" that because an attorney was considered to be an
officer of the court, the state could prevent a resident alien from
becoming an attorney. This argument was rejected by the Su-
preme Court of the United States. It concluded that an attorney
does not perform any governmental function and thus an indi-
vidual could not be barred from being an attorney on that basis
alone.1
12
In many other contexts courts have held that the attorneys'
title of officer of the court did not make them officers of the
government.110 The early cases concerned whether an attorney
was required to take a certain type of oath' 1' or whether women
could be attorneys." 5 The issue has also arisen in interpreting
statutes that give courts power to hold their officers in con-
Brown v. United States, 434 U.S. 872 (1977).
107. United States v. Bourassa, 411 F.2d 69 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 915
(1969).
108. United States v. Hall, 346 F.2d 875 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 910 (1965).
109. Id. at 882; 411 F.2d at 74.
110. MODEL RULES OF PROESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.4 (1983).
111. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
112. Id. at 729.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 21-26; see also cases cited supra note 32.
114. See supra note 26.
115. See supra note 32.
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tempt. The case most often cited is Cammer v. United States11
in which Justice Black's opinion for the Supreme Court held
that for the purposes of the federal contempt statute, an attor-
ney was not an officer of the court, distinguishing him from
clerks, marshals, and bailiffs. The opinion did not specify what
status an attorney occupies as an officer of the court; it was
clear, however, that the attorney is not an officer of the court in
the usual sense of the term.117 Michigan, on the other hand, has
a supreme court rule that expressly provides that "[a]ttorneys
and counselors are officers of the courts of this state and as such
are subject to the summary jurisdiction of such courts."118 The
rule goes on to provide jurisdiction over any complaint filed by a
client against an attorney, including fee disputes.
The attorney's status as an officer of the court has also been
used to authorize control by the court over the amount of fees
charged, even without a statute such as in Michigan. The Min-
nesota Supreme Court has stated: "In fixing such fees, the attor-
ney's role as an officer of the court, as distinguished from his
purely private relationship to his client, must be borne in mind.
This status necessarily imposes upon the court supervisory con-
trol of the amount of fees allowed."' '19
A similar position was taken in a Maryland case which
stated that the basis for the court's supervision of contracts be-
tween attorneys and clients "exists only because of the attor-
ney's status as an officer of the court."120 An Ohio court, in rul-
ing upon an appeal from a judgment in favor of an attorney
suing for a fee, stated that "an attorney, as an officer of the
court and subservient to its canons, cannot call upon the courts
to enforce a contract, although not fraudulent, which is over-
116. 350 U.S. 399 (1956).
117. Id. at 405.
118. MICH. G.C.R. § 908 (1963), quoted in MaIjack v. Murphy, 385 Mich. 210, 215
n.5, 188 N.W.2d 539, 541 n.5 (1971). Michigan also has a statute which created the State
Bar of Michigan and provides that members of the State Bar are officers of the court
with the exclusive right to designate themselves as attorneys and counselors, attorneys at
law, or lawyers. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.901 (1981)(McH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.901
(1976)).
119. Peterson v. Peterson, 274 Minn. 568, 571, 144 N.W.2d 597, 600 (1966); contra
U.S. v. Vague, 697 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1983).
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reaching, unconscionable, unreasonable or unfair. '121
Courts have become so accustomed to relying on the "officer
of the court" title as a catchall for justifying their actions with
respect to attorneys that they have even applied it to persons
who are neither attorneys nor court officials or employees. In a
North Dakota case, 122 the court held that several pro se litigants
were officers of the court. The trial court found that the litigants
had committed a fraud upon the court. In rejecting an argument
made by the litigants that they were not officers of the court and
therefore could not commit a fraud upon the court, the Supreme
Court of North Dakota stated: "We do not agree. . . .A pro se
litigant is as much an officer of the court as a licensed attorney,
and misconduct by either can be fraud on the court. 1 23 Law stu-
dents have also been given the same title in a case involving ac-
cess to a law library. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, in upholding a rule that denied a nonlawyer access
to a law library but permitted access by attorneys and law stu-
dents, characterized both of the latter as officers of the court,
thereby justifying their different treatment.
124
Of the cases set forth in this section, several assert that
courts have authority over certain matters involving attorneys
based upon the "officer of the court" title. In these cases, the
courts reviewed fee arrangements between attorneys and clients.
Other courts have, however, exercised the same authority, rely-
ing upon either their control over the bar 25 or the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility,1 26 without mentioning the "officer of
the court" title. That title is not, consequently, a prerequisite for
the exercise of the authority.
VI. CONCLUSION
The title of attorneys as officers of the court has both an
ancient tradition and a contemporary significance. The title has
been recognized in England for several centuries and in this
121. Jacobs v. Holston, 70 Ohio App. 2d 55, 59, 434 N.E.2d 738, 741 (1980).
122. Gajewski v. Bratcher, 240 N.W.2d 871 (N.D. 1976).
123. Id. at 893.
124. Stacey v. Greer, 647 F.2d 166 (6th Cir. 1981).
125. American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 66 N.J. 258, 330
A.2d 350 (1974).
126. Florida Bar v. Moriber, 314 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1975).
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country since the middle of the nineteenth century. It has been
used for a multitude of purposes, from justifying court control of
the legal profession to providing a basis for compelling an attor-
ney to testify without payment of an expert witness fee. It has
been demonstrated that the assumed historical relationship bet-
ween the "officer of the court" title and judicial regulation of the
bar is neither historically accurate nor the actual basis for con-
trol by the courts. It has also been demonstrated that the use of
the "officer of the court" title as the basis for defining the obli-
gations of attorneys is unnecessary and has been accompanied
by little or no analysis of the title and its relationship to the
specific privilege or duty. For every application of these obliga-
tions in terms of "officers of the court," there is a superior alter-
native rationale based upon the needs of the courts and the role
attorneys play in the legal process.
Little would be lost if the title "officer of the court" were
never again used, and much would be gained if courts would
forego the easy reliance on the "officer of the court" title and
instead make a functional analysis to determine the necessity of
the duty. Here, as elsewhere in legal thought, a label is never a
satisfactory substitute for disciplined and thoughtful analysis.
This is particularly true when the issue is whether the legisla-
ture or the courts have the final word on control of the legal
profession, an important separation of powers question.
Several courts have suggested an appropriate use of the "of-
ficer of the court" title of attorneys. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court has referred to the "officer of the court" title as simply
characterizing the close relationship among attorneys, the
courts, and the administration of justice.127 Two judges of the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit have stated
that "officer of the court" refers not to an official status but
rather to the fact the lawyers are "closely associated with, and
have important responsibilities within the court system. '128 Five
127. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
128. Piper v. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 723 F.2d 110, 120 (1st Cir.
1983)(opinion of Campbell, C.J., and Breyer, J.), prob. juris. noted, 104 S. Ct. 2149
(1984). In this case an equally divided court affirmed the district court's ruling that New
Hampshire's residency requirement for bar admission violated the privileges and immu-
nities clause. In Lowrie v. Goldenhersh, 716 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1983), the court, rejecting
an attack on Illinois' requirement that an attorney admitted in another state must take
the Illinois bar examination to be admitted in Illinois, used the title "officers of the
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judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit stated that attorneys' role in the judicial process is recog-
nized in an informal manner by referring to them as officers of
the court.129 These opinions accept the "officer of the court" title
for attorneys, not as a status from which certain duties flow, but
simply as a descriptive label that incorporates all of the duties
which are otherwise applicable to the attorney. Thus, the title is
used on occasion as a shorthand expression designed to convey
the unique role that attorneys play in our legal system and the
dependence of the courts upon them.
It is clear, however, that the "officer of the court" title
should never be used as a substitute for a rigorous analysis to
determine the duties of any person who plays a significant role
in the legal process. When used loosely, the phrase becomes a
crutch for courts seeking to reach a result without developing an
acceptable rationale for doing so. Even its use as nothing more
than a descriptive label is dangerous because of the difficulty of
confining its use to that limited purpose. It is almost inevitable
that if the title is used as a descriptive label, the label will soon
become a substitute for the necessary functional analysis. The
time has come for the title "officer of the court" to go the way of
the attorney's court gown, a symbol of that title in medieval
England, now nothing more than a part of the fascinating his-
tory of the English bar.
courts" in quotation marks to indicate the essential role attorneys play in the adminis-
tration of justice. Id. at 414.
129. Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505 F.2d 1334, 1345 (5th Cir.) (concurring opinion), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1011 (1975).
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